When the Royals City Connect jerseys came out, I wanted one immediately. I love the jersey. Also, quite immediately, I knew exactly which player\u2019s name I wanted emblazoned on the back. Readers, it was Brady Singer.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
As such, I take the blame for the Brady Singer – Jonathan India trade. It\u2019s hard to talk about India\u2019s season without mentioning Singer. Overall, Singer had a solid season, hanging right around a 4.00 ERA (and peripherals) for 2.9 fWAR. He did Brady Singer things, including not pitching in the postseason (sadly). It was relatively unremarkable. Or normal. Cromulent. However you\u2019d like to say it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
India, on the other hand, had anything but a cromulent season. The expectation coming into the season was that the Royals had found their leadoff hitter. The table-setter in front of Bobby Witt Jr that could unleash Witt\u2019s RBI potential. That\u2026did not really happen.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
The top-line numbers are these \u2014 .233 \/ .323 \/ .346 for an 89 wRC+, a career worst. His .113 ISO was the lowest it\u2019s ever been. With defensive numbers on FanGraphs that were\u2026unkind\u2026that all combined for -0.3 fWAR.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
That is most definitely not what the Royals envisioned. What happened?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
At the beginning, India was a lock for the leadoff spot. Whenever he started, he was hitting leadoff all the way until early August, when Matt Quatraro finally moved him closer to the bottom of the order. That didn\u2019t seem to do a whole lot, as his performance was mostly bad in any lineup slot. But a worse hitter is better buried at the bottom than consistently making outs in front of Witt, Vinnie, Maikel, and Salvy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
He was a bit unlucky – Statcast\u2019s expected metrics vs. actual metrics show some difference. Having said that, there are two issues that jumped out at me. One, he wasn\u2019t punishing fastballs, and as a result he saw a career-high rate of fastballs thrown to him. He just really struggled to punish strikes. That\u2019s a bad position for any hitter. On top of that, the vast majority of fly balls he hit were cans of corn. He was not doing any damage in the air – he had a .138 batting average \/ .356 slugging percentage on fly balls, good for a 22 wRC+. His career worst prior to 2025 on this metric was 84 wRC+ in 2022 (.181\/.533). Almost any ball India put in the air was an automatic out, especially to the opposite field (like more than is usual).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
I feel like his performance on fly balls *could* regress to the mean in 2026, but the inability to hit fastballs combined with seeing a higher rate of fastballs tells me that pitchers just didn\u2019t fear him this year. His plate discipline remains an asset, but it\u2019s not good enough to cover up stark weakness on contact.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
On defense, India alternated mostly between third base and left field until Maikel Garcia earned the every day third base spot and Michael Massey\u2019s back eventually needed a break. India did not really show he could handle left field, for that matter, so perhaps it was best for all parties involved. In mid-May, India became the every day second baseman, sometimes getting some DH slots for a break.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
It did not matter all that much where he was playing. The defensive metrics were not kind to his performance. I remember all-too-many frustrated social media posts when he booted a grounder at second base or failed a double play flip. He did not really have a good defensive reputation before 2025, though, so I do not think anything that occurred this year was different than the perception coming into the year. He is who he is, and we all knew who he was on defense.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
India was mostly durable – there may have been some day-to-day type issues early in the season, but he had only one stint on the IL, in September for a sprained wrist.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n