\n\tNoah Cameron<\/a> has a problem, and it isn’t his curveball. It’s everything around it. His curve remains one of the five most effective breaking pitches in baseball, but it has become the only pitch in his arsenal that hitters still have to respect.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tOver the past two seasons, Cameron’s curveball has struck out 40.1% of the hitters who have faced it while allowing just a .165 batting average, a .224 slugging percentage, and a .210 wOBA. It has performed at the same level as Ranger Su\u00e1rez’s and Joey Cantillo<\/a>‘s. It’s the kind of pitch any starter would want as the foundation of his repertoire.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tIt’s also the only pitch in his arsenal that has maintained that level of performance. That has changed the way hitters attack him.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tIn 2025, hitters chased 32.2% of Cameron’s curveballs thrown outside the strike zone. The pitch generated a 37.4% whiff rate and produced a Run Value of +2.7 per 100 pitches. In 2026, those numbers have moved in the opposite direction. His O-Swing rate has fallen to 25.7%, the whiff rate has dropped to 29.5%, and the pitch now carries a Run Value of -0.3 per 100 pitches.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tThe pitch itself has barely changed. Its velocity, vertical movement, and spin profile have remained almost identical. What changed was the hitters\u2019 response. They\u2019re no longer chasing it at the same rate. One plausible explanation is that the rest of Cameron\u2019s arsenal no longer poses enough of a threat to force hitters to protect the zone early in the count.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tThe rest of his arsenal supports that theory. None of his other pitches has complemented the curveball with any consistency. His four-seam fastball has allowed a 49.3% HardHit rate and a .280 batting average. The cutter hasn\u2019t provided a reliable alternative either, surrendering a .338 average, while both the slider and sinker have been hit even harder. Combined, those four pitches account for 61.5% of Cameron\u2019s repertoire, compared to just 16.8% for his curveball. The results suggest hitters can afford to wait for something more hittable instead of protecting against his best pitch.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tHis pitch usage by count tells the same story. When ahead, Cameron throws his curveball 7.1% of the time and allows just a .084 batting average against it. That\u2019s exactly the type of pitch a starter wants to finish an at-bat. When he falls behind, however, the curveball nearly disappears, dropping to just 2.3% usage, while his repertoire shifts toward fastballs, against which opponents are batting .329.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tThat split is unlikely to be a coincidence. It illustrates how Cameron’s pitch mix changes once he loses control of the count. The issue isn’t that he relies too little on the curveball when ahead\u2014it remains dominant in those situations. The challenge comes when he has to lean on the rest of his arsenal to regain leverage in the count.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tAt the same time, Cameron has improved in several important areas. His strikeout rate has climbed from the 55th percentile to the 82nd, while his walk rate has improved from the 33rd to the 75th. He’s commanding the strike zone more effectively and generating more swings and misses overall. The quality of contact, however, has moved sharply in the opposite direction. His Hard Hit percentile has fallen from the 82nd to the 48th, his Barrel percentile from the 73rd to the 24th, and the Run Value of his breaking pitches from the 99th to the 21st. Hitters aren’t just making more contact; they’re doing far more damage when they connect.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tThe lack of a reliable second pitch helps explain that pattern. The slider is the clearest example. In 2025, it held hitters to a .205 batting average and a .256 slugging percentage while generating a 31.1% whiff rate. One year later, those numbers have climbed to .300 and .550, prompting Cameron to reduce its usage from 14.1% to 9.6%. The sinker hasn’t offered an answer either, allowing a .636 batting average. His changeup, meanwhile, has been his second-most effective pitch, producing just a 24.1% HardHit rate, and it may represent his best option for bringing more balance to the repertoire.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n \n\tNoah Cameron’s curveball has never stopped being an elite pitch. What has changed is everything around it. Until the rest of his repertoire forces hitters to respect more than one weapon, his curveball will continue carrying a burden no single pitch can shoulder on its own.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n\n\n
\n \n\n\t\t\t\tMetric\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n \n\t\t\t\t2025\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n \n\t\t\t\t2026\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n \n\t\t\t\tChange\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n \n \n\t\t\t\tO-Swing%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t32.20%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t25.70%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t-6.5 pp\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n \n\t\t\t\tWhiff%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t37.40%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t29.50%\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t-7.9 pp\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n \n\t\t\t\tRun Value\/100\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t2.7\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t-0.3\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t-3\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \n\n
\n \n\n\t\t\t\tSituation\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n \n\t\t\t\tAVG vs. Curveball\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n \n\t\t\t\tAVG vs. Fastballs\n\t\t\t<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n \n \n\t\t\t\tPitcher Ahead\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t.084\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t.167\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n \n\t\t\t\tPitcher Behind\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t.211\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n \n\t\t\t\t.329\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
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